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MAINE V. JOHNSON. A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
FOR THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE AND THE PENOBSCOT
NATION
Whitney Austin Walstad'

Introduction
In August of 2007, the First Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in
Maine v. Johnson.' Declaring that regulation of pollutants by Indians into
Indian waters was not within the scope of tribes' explicit authority over
"internal tribal matters," the First Circuit concluded that two tribes in
Maine -

the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation -

lacked the

authority to regulate the discharge of pollutants by tribal-owned facilities into
tribal waters.2
This decision, which reversed an order of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) prohibiting the State of Maine from regulating the pollutants
being discharged from the two Indian-owned facilities, endangers the quality
of water inside and surrounding the tribes' territories. Water quality is critical
to tribal members' ability to fish for sustenance, an activity upon which their
entire cultures are based. Paper companies and other municipalities have been
dumping waste into the tribes' waters; one specific company, Lincoln Pulp &
Paper, has dumped dioxin and other dangerous substances directly "into the
Penobscot Indian Reservation." 3 Dioxin is one of the most powerful and toxic
carcinogens which accumulates in fish and other river organisms and thus
poses an enormous threat to people dependant upon those very waters and
fish.4 By narrowing the meaning of "internal tribal matters," this decision not
only diminished the tribes' sovereignty, but creates environmental and health
concerns as well.

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2007).
at 45-47.
2. Id.
3. Final Brief of Petitioners, Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe, at 8,
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. EPA, No. 04-1375 (Consolidated with No. 1363) (1st Cir. Dec. 22,
2006) (Final Corrected Brief) [hereinafter Final Brief of Petitioners].
4. Id. at 7.
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This note will examine Maine v. Johnson and provide a rationale for why
the First Circuit should have upheld the EPA's order. Part I will examine the
background of both tribes involved, as well as the history of events leading up
to and including the Maine Indian Land Claims Act. Part II will analyze the
sovereignty status of Indian tribes generally as well as that of the two tribes
involved. Part III will discuss the Clean Water Act as well as the background
of Maine v. Johnson. Part IV will analyze the arguments and contentions of
all parties and the First Circuit's decision. Finally, Part V will critique the
First Circuit's decision and discuss how the court could have used the
resources available to perform a more in-depth analysis thereby protecting the
tribes.
L Backgroundof the Tribes
The Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation are two of four
federally recognized Indian tribes located within Maine's geographic
boundaries.5 Today, the Passamaquoddy Tribe is located in the coastal regions
of Maine, primarily along the Passamaquoddy Bay, and along the St. Croix
River and its tributaries. 6 The name "Passamaquoddy" - originating from the
word "pestemohkatiyak"which literally means "pollock-spearer" or "those of
the place where the pollock are plentiful" - not only reflects the importance
of this specific fish, but fishing generally to the tribe's way of life.7 The
dependence of the tribe upon the St. Croix River for their "cultural, spiritual,
and physical well-being" indicates its "deep and critical connection" to the
waters.8
Thus, water regulations have major implications for the
Passamaquoddy Tribe.
The Penobscot Indian Nation is centered around the Penobscot River and
Bay in Penobscot County, Maine; 9 the tribe's name reflects the importance of
the river to the Nation's livelihood. The Penobscot people have "occupied the

5. The Passamoquoddy Tribe of Maine - Jurisdictional Issues, http://www.passama
quoddy.com/land claims/jurisdictionalissues.htm (last visited June 9, 2008). The other two
federally recognized tribes are the Houlton Band of Maliseets and the Aroostook Band of
Micmacs. Id.
6. PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE, PASSAMAQUODDY,
AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND 75 (1985).
7. Vincent 0. Erickson & Bruce G. Trigger, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy,in HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS VOL. 15: NORTHEAST 123, 135 (William C. Sturdevant & Bruce

G. Trigger eds., 1978).
8. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31.
9. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 74-75.
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Penobscot River watershed and relied upon its water and resources for
physical, cultural, and spiritual sustenance"' for hundreds of years. The
"Penobscot Nation is literally in and of the Penobscot River" and "its cultural
survival depends upon the health of the river, and its members depend upon
its resources for their physical and spiritual sustenance.""
The pollutants being discharged directly into tribal waters threaten the
tribes' deeply rooted connection and dependence on their natural resources.
Thus, the First Circuit's decision is bound to come with major implications for
both tribes.
A. A Brief History
To understand the unique status of each tribe, it is essential to understand
the tribes' complex history with the state. Most significant to that history is
the Maine Indian Land Claims Act of 1980; over the course of a few very
important events in the 1960s and 1970s, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and
Penobscot Nation discovered they had valid claims to several thousand acres
of land held by the State for hundreds of years.' 2
The basis for the land claims began with the passage of the Non-Intercourse
Act 3 by the first Congress in 1790.14 The Act governed a variety of activities
between Indians and non-Indians.' 5 Among those activities, the NonIntercourse Act required that any land transfer from Indians or Indian tribes be
approved by the United States Congress.' 6 This provision was enacted to
protect Indians from unfair transfers of land; its importance has caused the
Non-Intercourse Act to become known as the "linchpin of Federal Indian
law."' 7 Over the ensuing years, title to most of the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot land was transferred to the State of Maine through agreements,
sales, and leases in which the tribes relinquished the majority of their
territories. 8 Hundreds ofyears later it was discovered that these transfers.were
never approved by Congress as mandated by the Non-Intercourse Act.'9

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 6.
Id. at 32.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12 (1980).
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Title to this relinquished land was never seriously in question until the early
1960s, when one of the governors of the Passamaquoddy Tribe discovered a
copy of a 1794 treaty between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the
tribe that had been kept in a shoebox for several years.2" This treaty formed
the basis for the Penobscot Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe to instigate
claims for several thousand acres of land being held by the state. 2' The
document reserved 23,000 acres of land for the Indians, in addition to fifteen
islands in waters surrounding the township; 22 however, by the time the treaty
was discovered, the Indians no longer controlled the islands, which comprised
about 6000 acres reserved to them by the deed.23 Although this deed
confirmed the validity of the land claims, the Passamaquoddy Tribe had a
difficult time finding an attorney who would take on their case. 4
These deeds, transfers, and agreements that gave away so much of these
tribes' land were never approved by Congress as required by the NonIntercourse Act, and were therefore technically invalid.25 When the tribe
realized this, tribal members gained confidence in the tribe's claims, and began
demonstrations on land under state or private party control that they believed
rightfully belonged to the tribe. 6 In addition, the tribal officers met with high
level state officials to give notice of their claim.27 Eventually, the tribe secured
an attorney; realizing the potential of the claims, the Passamaquoddy tribe
asked the United States to bring suit against Maine on its behalf.2 ' However,
the tribe was denied their request on the "grounds that the Non-Intercourse Act
does not apply to non-recognized tribes and on the grounds that there was,
2'' 9
thus, no trust relationship between the United States and the Maine tribes.
The tribe next brought a declaratory judgment action against the Secretary
of the Interior and the United States Attorney General; in 1972, the tribe won
an order forcing the United States to file a protective action on its behalf.3" In
1975, the United States District Court for the District of Maine held that the

20. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 69.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.at 70.
Id.at 69.
Id.at 70.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12 (1980).
26. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 71-72.
27. Id. at 71
28. Id.at 72.
29. H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12.
30. Joint Tribal Council ofthe Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me.
1975); see also H.R. REP. No.96-1353, at 13.
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Non-Intercourse Act applied to all Indian tribes, both federally and nonfederally recognized."a In addition, the district court held that the NonIntercourse Act created a trust relationship between the United States and all
Indian tribes.32 After intervening as a party defendant in the original action,
the state and certain federal officials appealed the district court's decision.33
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision and held that the United States had a duty to
investigate and take action on behalf of any tribe when there had been an
alleged violation of the Non-Intercourse Act.34
This was a small
accomplishment in and of itself, as up to that point, no court had ordered the
federal government to file a claim on behalf of anyone, "much less a multimillion-dollar lawsuit on behalf of a powerless and virtually penniless Indian
tribe. 35
B. The Settlement: The Maine Indian Land Claims Act of 1980
Once the potential for such complex litigation began to receive attention
from the highest levels of the federal government, President Jimmy Carter
appointed retired Georgia Supreme Court Justice William Gunter to study the
case.36 After a "substantial study of the merits of the claims and the defenses
to them, Justice Gunter recommended that the case be settled."3 7
The Department of Justice then analyzed the case and described it as
"potentially the most complex litigation ever brought in the federal courts with
social costs and economic impacts without precedent and incredible litigation
costs to all parties."38 Obviously the risk of going to trial had the potential for
enormous consequences for the state. On the other hand, no tribe had ever
won an action of this kind for the "return of any significant amount of land."'3 9

31. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 660.
32. Id. at 667.
33. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.

1975).
34. Id.; see Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1065 (1st Cir. 1979)
(holding that tribes are entitled to protection under Federal Indian common law doctrines); see
also H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 13. This holding was later supported in another First Circuit
decision.
35. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 89.
36. H.R. REP No. 96-1353, at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 13-14.
39. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 96.
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By this point in time, the amount of land in question had grown
exponentially. Because of the litigation, title to up to 12.5 million acres of
land 40 was in jeopardy and more than 350,000 people lived on the disputed
lands,4 thereby creating title uncertainty with the potential to undermine the
value of all of the property. In fact, in 1976 a municipal bond counsel based
out of Boston informed the State of Maine that "it would no longer be able to
give unqualified approval to municipal bonds issued within the disputed
area. '4 2 At stake for the Indians was the return of the millions of acres of land
that had been wrongfully taken from them over the years, or possibly billions
of dollars in actual and punitive damages.43 Settlement negotiations
succeeded, and in 1980, the settlement was recorded by the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement."4
The terms of the settlement provided for the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the
Penobscot Nation to retain their reservation lands and all lands owned by them
that had not been subsequently transferred away. 4 In addition, the settlement
provided that all land claims of the tribes would be extinguished in exchange
for an appropriation of $81.5 million as follows: $54.5 million was established
as a Land Acquisition Fund,46 and $27 million went to a settlement fund and
was to be divided equally between the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the
Penobscot Nation.4 ' The Land Acquisition Fund was established with the hope
of purchasing 150,000 acres for each tribe.4 ' This purchased land would be
held in trust by the United States for both the Passamaquoddy Tribe 49 and
Penobscot Nation.50
Although this arrangement appears favorable to the tribes, there were other
terms of the settlement which favored the state. Under the Maine Indian

40. H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 14 (noting that the 12.5 million acres in question constituted
sixty percent of the State of Maine).
41. Id.A significant portion of the acreage in dispute was "owned" by several large timber
and paper companies which are now part of the pollution problem in the Maine v. Johnson case,
and "whose vast holdings had long made them the dominant economic and political force in
Maine." BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 98.
42. BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 97.
43. Id
44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (2000). The settlement is also codified at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-6214 (1996).
45. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6203.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1724(c) (2000).
47. Id. § 1724(a),(b)(l).
48. Id.§ 1724(d).
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 30, § 6205(1)(b).
50. Id.§ 6205(2)(b).
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Claims Settlement, the state assumed jurisdiction over most of the tribes'
activities. The settlement provided:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe
and the Penobscot Nation, within their respective territories, shall
have, exercise, and enjoy all the fights, privileges, powers and
immunities, including, but without limitation, . . . liabilities and
limitations of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State,
provided, however, that internal tribal matters, including
membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside
within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal
government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement
fund income shall not be subject to regulation by the State."
The settlement gave the tribes the status of municipalities and made persons
and property subject to the laws of the state within the respective tribal
territories.
III. Tribal Sovereignty
Generally, Indian tribes possess "those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute ... ."" Tribes retain elements of "quasisovereignty" after turning land over to the United States and acknowledging
their dependence on the federal government." One of those aspects of
sovereignty possessed by Indian tribes is the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit.54 The federal government has had a long
history of encouraging tribal self-governance, reflecting the fact that tribes
"retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory' . . . to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal
statute or treaty."' 55 This policy operates "even in areas where state control has
not been affirmatively preempted by federal statute."56

51. Id. § 6206(1) (emphasis added).
52. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 699 (1993).
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
54. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991).
55. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (quoting United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (internal citation omitted).
56. Id.
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A. The Maine Tribes' Sovereignty

The sovereignty status of the Maine tribes prior to the Settlement Act was
one of the points hotly contested in Maine v. Johnson.57 It is important to
understand the level of sovereignty the Tribes held prior to the act because it
modified their existing sovereignty status. The Tribes argued that if they
retained their inherent sovereignty prior to the settlement, certain federal
discussed above required the government to
Indian common law doctrines
58
sovereignty.
that
protect
There were multiple cases prior to Maine v. Johnson whose holdings had
an effect on the tribal status of either the Passamaquoddy Tribe or the
Penobscot Nation."
One of the most important was Bottomly v.
60
PassamaquoddyTribe. This case concerned a contract dispute in which an
attorney sought to recover fees from the Tribe for legal work.6 The real issue
in the case boiled down to whether or not the Tribe and its officers were
protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.62 The Bottomly
court concluded that the Passamaquoddy Tribe was, in fact, entitled to the
of sovereign immunity, and therefore the Tribe was
benefits of the doctrine
6
immune from suit. 1
The State contended the Tribes had a diminished level of sovereignty prior
to the Maine Indian Claims Settlement because of the lack of dealings the
Maine also viewed the
federal government had had with the Tribes.'
settlement itself as keeping general federal Indian common law from affecting
the terms of the agreement.65 However, the Tribes viewed one House Report
as confirming that their sovereignty remained intact at the point in time when
the settlement took place.66 That report summarized the Bottomly case as
57. Prior to the Settlement Acts, the State of Maine passed laws governing the internal
affairs of the two tribes, even threatening to change their laws or to terminate the tribes. H.R.
REP. No. 96-1353, at 11 (1980).
58. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 19.
59. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D.
Me. 1975); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1975); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979).
60. Bottomly, 599 F.2d 1061.
61. Id. at 1062.
62. Id. at 1061.
63. Id. at 1066.
64. Id. at 1065.
65. Corrected Brief of Petitioner State ofMaine at 22, Maine v. Johnson, No. 04-1363/041375 (Dec. 26, 2006) (consolidated) [hereinafter Corrected Brief of Petitioner].
66. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 19.
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holding that "the Maine tribes still possess inherent sovereignty to the same
extent as other tribes in the United States."67 This holding is important
because the Tribes argued that Congress had a duty to protect the "inherent
authority" of Indian tribes "to govern reservation affairs from state
encroachment."6' 8
In determining what constitutes "internal tribal matters," it is necessary to
have an understanding of the background of law relating to water pollution and
pollutant discharges. This information comes from the Clean Water Act.
B. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act 69 is the culmination of an extensive environmental
campaign to codify and nationalize "the business of water pollution control in
the United States, relegating the states, whose authority had long dominated
the area, to a largely secondary, supporting role."7 One of the Act's most
important features is the National Point Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), a permitting program which regulates point source discharges
throughout the United States. 7 Specifically, the Act provides for a permitting
program for the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.72 The key to the
NPDES program is that without an NPDES permit, facilities may not
discharge any pollutants.73
Alternatively, the Act provides the ability for states to apply for a state
permitting program, whereby a state may "administer its own permit program
for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction .

. . ."

This

provision allows a ninety-day period for the EPA to approve the state's
permitting program,75 and reserves the authority to the EPA to object to any
proposed state permitting program if the state's program does not meet the
67. H.R. REP. No. 96-1353 at 14. See generallyBottomly, 599 F.2d at 1064-66 (discussing
sovereignty status of Passamaquoddy Tribe, and determining that the Tribe had enough
sovereignty to qualify for immunity from suit).
68. Final Brief of Petitioners, supranote 3, at 11 (citing Opinion of the Department of the

Interior, Office of the Solicitor Re: Effect of Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act on State of
Maine's Application to Administer National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
May 16, 2000).

69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
70. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today--Has the Clean WaterAct Been A Success?,

55 ALA. L. REv. 537, 537 (2004).
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).

72. Id. § 1342(a)(1).
73. Id. § 1342.
74. Id. § 1342(b).

75. Id. § 1342(c)(1).
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requirements of the Clean Water Act; the EPA may also retake permitting
authority from states under certain circumstances.76
In addition, the Clean Water Act provides a way for Indian tribes to apply
for permitting authority just as a state would." Section 518 of the Act allows
tribes to be treated like states for the purposes of applying for and obtaining
permits for the discharge of pollutants into tribal waters. 8 Treatment of a tribe
as a state requires the tribe to have a governing body capable of performing
"substantial government duties and powers"79 and that the activities to be
exercised by the tribe pertain to protection of water resources that are the tribes
own. 80 It is not apparent that the Passamaquoddy Tribe or Penobscot Nation
have applied for this type of system yet- they simply hope to keep regulatory
authority with the EPA instead of the state.
In fact, today, thirty-one federally recognized tribes have their own water
regulation standards pursuant to the Clean Water Act, section 518.8" Many of
those tribes who do regulate their own water have statements of purpose,
similar to the Pueblo of Acoma, which states that the regulation of water is to
promote the "healthy propagation of fish, other aquatic life, and wildlife," "to
prescribe water quality criteria in order to protect groundwater," and to "ensure
that degradation of existing water quality does not occur."82 Specifically, each
tribe that retains its own water quality standards notes that "section 518 of the
Clean Water Act allows federally recognized Indian tribes to enact water
quality standards for the purpose of protecting waters within the exterior
boundary of tribal lands."83 Although the tribes at issue have not sought that
type of authority, the fact that Congress made a special provision for tribes in
the Act denotes their recognition of the importance of water quality to tribes.

76. For example, state authority may be revoked when it is determined that "a State is not
administering a program approved under this section in accordance with requirements of this
section." Id. § 1342(c)(3).
77. Id.§ 1377(e).
78. Id.
79. Id.§ 1377(e)(1).
80. Id.§ 1377(e)(2).
81. EPA Water Quality Standards: State, Tribal, and Territorial Standards, http://www.epa.
gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes.html (last visited June 9, 2008).
82. EPA Water Quality Standards Library: Pueblo of Acoma Water Quality Standards
(Dec. 2005), available athttp://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/acoma.
pdf (last visited June 9, 2008).
83. Id.
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IV.Backgroundof Maine v. Johnson
The main issue in Maine v. Johnson was which entity should control the
issuance of permits for the discharge of pollutants into waters in and
surrounding tribal territory- the EPA, or Maine. This issue developed
following Maine's application for NPDES permitting authority pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b). Because the Settlement Act and Maine Implementing Act
(MIA) appear to divest the Tribes of some important attributes of tribal
sovereignty, but reserve "internal tribal matters" as an area of governance with
which the state cannot interfere, the critical dispute centered on the meaning
of "internal tribal matters" and whether the issuance of permits for the
discharge of pollutants fell within that category of authority.
This was such a critical question because the State "has an interest in
ensuring that industries and other pollution dischargers along the river are not
hampered by federal (or potentially tribal) restrictions to better protect the
environment."'
Thus, in order to accommodate the several large paper
companies situated in the areas at issue, the State might not set standards that
would ensure the water quality necessary to sustain the Tribe's sustenance and
dependence on the rivers. It is not surprising that the State has taken the side
of protecting the needs of these powerful paper and timber companies.
Pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Clean Water Act, the State of
Maine applied for a state permitting program in lieu of the EPA program on
November 18, 1999.85 Maine's application presented questions regarding its
authority over twenty-one facilities, nineteen of which were non-Indian
facilities discharging pollutants into tribal waters, and the other two facilities
were tribal-owned and discharging into tribal waters. 86 The ninety-day
application period was extended four times for debate and discussion and
September 26, 2000, was set as the new deadline for the EPA to make a
decision as to the permitting authority Maine had applied for, however, this
deadline came and went without a decision by the EPA.87
Eventually the EPA suspended issuance of the permits as required by §
1342(c)(1),88 which provides that no later than ninety days after a state applies
for a permitting program, the issuance of permits for those discharges subject
to the program shall be suspended unless it is determined that the State permit
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 35.
Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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program does not meet the requirements or guidelines set forth within the
statute.8 9 In January of 2001, the EPA approved the state's permitting program
in all areas outside disputed Indian territory, but made no decision regarding
the disputed applicability of the state's jurisdiction in Indian country.9 °
Two years later, in October of 2003, the EPA gave Maine the authority to
issue permits to (and therefore control the regulation of) the nineteen nonIndian owned facilities that discharged pollutants within the territorial waters
of the tribes. 91 As to two tribal-owned facilities, the EPA concluded the impact
of their discharges outside the tribes' territories was "so immaterial that the
permits fit within the internal tribal matters exception.'2
Petitions for judicial review followed the EPA's decision, and those
petitions were consolidated.93 The appeal went directly to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals.94 The First Circuit upheld the positions of Maine and the
EPA that "the nineteen non-Indian discharge sources draining into tribal
waters can be regulated by the state." 95 Referring to the explicit language of
section 6204 of the state statute reserving jurisdiction to Maine over "all
Indians, Indian nations, and tribes and bands of Indians in the State and any
lands or other natural resources owned by them ....
,96 the court extinguished
all of the tribes' arguments for assertion of authority of the two tribal-owned
facilities.
Thus, as to the two tribal-owned entities discharging into tribal waters, the
First Circuit reversed the determination of the EPA and ordered those two
facilities to comply with the state permitting program.97 This decision has
repercussions in many arenas of law; not only does the decision impact the
tribes' environment and the health and way of life of tribal members, it further
divests the tribes of sovereignty and self-govemance.

89. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (2000).
90. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 40.
91. Id.Whether the discharges were actually into Indian territories was indispute,but the
court assumed the discharges were into Indian territory for purposes of the case.The discharges
were into the navigable waters of the Penobscot,St. Croix, and Piscatiquis Rivers. Id. at 40 n.3.
92. Approval of Application by Maine to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES)Program, 68 Fed.Reg.65,052-01, 65,066 (Nov.18, 2003).
93. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 41.

94. Id.
95. Id.at 45.
96. ME.REV. STAT.ANN.tit.
30, § 6204 (1996).
97. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 49.
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A. The Tribes' Contentions
One of the Tribes' prime concerns was that "Maine's permitting program
might not ensure water quality standards adequate to protect the southern
tribes' right to fish for individual sustenance."98 Maine statutes actually grant
the right to regulate hunting and fishing to the tribes, 99 and courts have
recognized and upheld this right,"0 indicating the state-recognized importance
of these activities to the tribes' way of life.
On appeal at the First Circuit, the Tribes contended that the EPA erred in
approving Maine's program as to the nineteen non-tribal facilities that
discharge pollutants into tribal waters.' 0 ' The Tribes argued that under the
Settlement Acts, they had the right to regulate pollution by non-Indians within
their territories and that the "EPA has a trust obligation to retain permitting
authority to facilitate tribal control over the tribes' natural resources.' ' 10 2 In
addition, the Tribes argued that they share authority with the State, and should
therefore have control of the permitting. Next, they argued that the inherent
sovereignty of each tribe "remains intact" and thus the State lacked the
necessary regulatory power over the tribes.0 3 The Tribes also cited House and
Senate reports suggesting the sovereignty of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the
Penobscot Nation were on the same level as other Indian tribes.' 04
Contrary to the State's view of their status prior to the settlement, the Tribes
argued that Congress understood and expressly confirmed their inherent
sovereignty was still intact at the time of the settlement. 0 5 In addition, the
Tribes emphasized the First Circuit's decision in Bottomly as further
supporting the fact that the Tribes retained their sovereignty.
The Tribes relied upon federal Indian common law to combat the State's
argument that "the Penobscot Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe had no
inherent sovereignty because their historic domination by Maine had, over
time, destroyed it.' 0 6 A tribe's sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of

98. Id. at 41.
99. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6207.
100. Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 485 (Me. 1983) (holding that tribal
sovereignty allows regulation of fishing and hunting by Indians on land owned by or held in
trust for the tribe).
101. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 41.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 42.
104. Id. at43.
105. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 21.
106. Id. at 19-20.
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Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the
tribesretain theirexistingsovereignpowers."'' 7 In addition, the Tribes argued
that "neither the passage of time nor apparent assimilation of the Indians can
be interpreted as diminishing or abandoning a tribe's status as a self-governing
entity. ' ' Thus, the Tribes attempted to make the argument that prior to the
Settlement Acts, despite their history of unsatisfactory treatment by the state,
they still possessed their inherent sovereignty to the same extent as any other
tribe.
The sovereignty status of the tribes is critical, and as the Tribes point out,
"the scope of 'internal tribal matters' is a question of law, informed by general
principles of federal Indian common law."' 9 If the tribes possessed their
inherent sovereignty prior to the settlement, general principles of federal
Indian law would require the government to protect that sovereignty, and
would require that protection to influence the interpretation of the phrase
"internal tribal matters.""1 0 On the other hand, the State seemed to argue that
the Settlement Acts overrode every other source of authority relating to federal
and Indian law and divested any sovereignty the Tribe may have had at that
point."' The State urged the most strict construction of the phrase "internal
tribal matters" and no protection from the federal government." 2
The Tribes' major contention was that the regulation of pollutants fell
within one of the categories of powers explicitly granted to the tribes by
statute - "internal tribal matters." The Maine law made it clear that the tribes
were:
subject to the laws of the State, provided, however, that internal
tribal matters, including membership in the respective tribe or
nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories,
tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use
or disposition of settlement fund income shall not be subject to
regulation by the State."3
The Tribes construed the provision, "internal tribal matters" broadly,
arguing that it encompassed discharges of pollutants into tribal waters, even
107. Id. at 21 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945 ed.)
(emphasis added)).

108. Id.at 22.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 11.
Id.
See generally Corrected Brief of Petitioner, supra note 65.
Id.

113. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 30, § 6206 (1) (1996) (emphasis added).
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by the nineteen non-Indian sources." 4 The First Circuit had even made it clear
that the language "including" following the phrase "internal tribal matters" is
a term of enlargement, "meaning
that 'there are other items includable, though
' 15
enumerated."'
not specifically
In addition, the Tribes urged the court to apply the same balancing test
developed by two prior decisions, Akins v. PenobscotNation"6 and Penobscot
Nation v. Fellencer,"7 to determine whether a specific issue is an "internal
tribal matter."' " The Akins court held that the issuance of stumpage permits
by the Penobscot Nation was an internal tribal matter and thus not subject to
regulation by the State of Maine.' The Fellencer court determined that a
decision by the Penobscot Nation Tribal Council to terminate the employment
of a non-Indian community health nurse constituted an "internal tribal matter"
within the meaning of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980.20 In
each instance, the Court considered (a) whether the matter concerned the
reservation resources or property of the tribe, (b) whether it involved the
interests of only Indians or also affected non-Indians, (c) the extent to which
state interests were involved, and (d) how the matter should be resolved, with
respect to competing state and tribal interests, under principles of federal
Indian law. The court considered each factor with respect to both parties
involved.' 2 '
Upon a proper balancing of the Akins/Fellencer factors and the interests at
stake, the Tribes concluded and insisted that regulation of their territorial
waters was certainly an internal tribal matter which they had the right to
control. 22 In fact, the EPA used this same analysis and determined that
because two facilities were owned and operated by the tribal governments and
non-Indians were not involved, "the federal interest in promoting tribal selfdetermination is very high and is not tempered by any substantial impacts on
non-members," thus 23explaining why the state lacked permitting authority over
those two facilities.

114. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2007).
115. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31 (citing Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. Mass.
Citizens For Life, Inc., 769 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1985)).
116. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 1997).
117. Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1999).
118. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 33.
119. Akins, 130 F.3d at 490.
120. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 707.
121. Id. at 709.
122. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 35-36.
123. Approval of Application by Maine to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge
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By allowing the State of Maine to regulate all twenty-one discharge
facilities at issue, the First Circuit has jeopardized the tribes' fishing rights, a
right that is granted to them by statute. 24 Specifically, the tribes project that
Maine will not set the permitting requirements at a high enough standard
required to ensure the tribes' ability to continue fishing for sustenance so as to
accommodate several large paper companies near the tribal lands. 22 Because
clean, healthy water plays a vital role in tribal culture and has a direct and
substantial effect on the health and welfare of the tribes, "the Tribes have a
strong interest in regulating on-reservation water quality.' ' 6
B. EPA S Contentions
The EPA took a slightly different approach to this issue- it did not agree
with the Tribes' argument that "internal tribal matters" encompassed the
nineteen non-Indian discharge sources. 127 However, as mentioned above, it did
agree that due to the size of the discharges of the two tribal-owned discharge
facilities, there are "no substantial impacts on non-members"'' 8 and therefore
regulation of permitting should be treated as an internal tribal matter.'29
C. The State of Maine's Contentions
The State took the position that it had authority to issue permits for all
twenty-one facilities in question. 3 ° Maine contended that the ability to
regulate the Tribes' land and natural resources was expressly reserved by
statute to the state,' 3 ' and thus, "Maine's power over the southern tribes greatly
narrows ordinary tribal sovereignty vis-A-vis state law.' 32 Maine claimed that
this grant satisfied the Clean Water Act, which requires a state to have
''
"adequate authority to carry out the described [state permitting] program. 3

Elimination System (NPDES) Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,052-01, 65,066 (Nov. 18, 2003).
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6207 (1996).
125. Final Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 3.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 40.
128. Approval of Application by Maine to Administer the NPDES Program, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 65,066.
129. Id.
130. Johnson, 498 F.3d at41.
131. Id.at 42-43; see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (1996) (stating that all Indians and
any lands and natural resources owned by them shall be subject to the laws of the state... "to
the same extent as any other persons or lands or other natural resources therein").
132. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 42.
133. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)).
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The state responded to the EPA's theory that unless there is a substantial
impact on non-tribal members, the activity is outside Maine's jurisdiction by
arguing that that theory "directly contravenes the plain language and intent of
Congress" that the Tribes be subject to regulation by the State with regard to
their land and natural resources, held in trust or otherwise. 34
Maine adopted a narrower view of the phrase "internal tribal matters" than
did the Tribes. The State claimed that the phrase should not apply to the
nineteen non-Indian discharge facilities, but also claimed that it should not
apply to the two tribal facilities that discharged into tribal waters. 3 The state
argued that in addition to the fact that the Settlement Acts explicitly granted
jurisdiction over land and natural resources to the state, there was nothing in
any statute that would suggest the tribal discharges were exempt from Maine's
jurisdiction as an "internal tribal matter."'' 36 Apparently, the state viewed the
list of examples of internal tribal matters provided in the statute as exclusive.
The state also examined the balancing test suggested in Akins/Fellencer.'
However, the state viewed the discharges from the Indian-owned facilities as
being more substantial than the Tribes did, thus making it an activity that is not
wholly "within the tribe."' 38 In addition, Maine relied on the strength of its
interests in regulating the pollution because the regulations would affect its
own environment and its own resources. 39 Also, the State pointed out that the
EPA made no finding that Maine's control of permitting had or would in any
' 40
way "hinder the tribes' efforts to protect their environmental concerns.'
Finally, the State argued that under the settlement, the EPA had no trust
responsibility over Indian territory."'
D. The First Circuit'sDecision
42
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the EPA'S decision de novo.1
The court agreed with the EPA that Maine had adequate authority to issue

134. Corrected Brief of Petitioners, supra note 65, at 26.
135. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 44.
136. Corrected Brief of Petitioners, supra note 65, at 30.
137. Id. at33.
138. Id.
139. Id. at38.
140. Id.at 39.
141. Id. at41.
142. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37,41 (1st Cir. 2007). The court noted that the EPA gets
deference in applying ambiguous terms in any statute that it administers, and that the EPA is
entitled to deference as to all factual findings it made unless they are unreasonable.
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permits for the nineteen non-Indian owned discharge facilities.143 The basis
for its decision rested in the explicit grant of authority to Maine over the
Tribes' land and natural resources as well as the fact that the Settlement Acts
"expressly divested the Maine Tribes of sovereign immunity."'"
In response to the Tribes' argument that certain House and Senate reports
referred to the Tribes as having the same amount of sovereignty as other
Indian tribes, the court noted that those reports referenced the view expressed
by the Bottomly court, which predated the Settlement Acts. Thus, the
Settlement Acts reflect a "redefined" scope of authority, "closer to Maine's
historic treatment rather than the full sovereignty asserted by the tribes. 145
The court agreed with a House Report and a Senate Report that the settlement
was a compromise in which the Tribes gave up their right to thousands of acres
of land in return for extending state power over Indian territory, with the
reservation that the Tribes would still be in control of "internal tribal
146
matters."'
The court considered the Tribes' argument for concurrent authority, but
determined that even if the State and the Tribes held concurrent authority, the
State would have control. 47 The court noted that the real issue was whether
Maine had adequate authority to issue permits for discharges into the tribal
waters, and that section 6204 was "about as explicit in conferring such
authority as is possible."' 48 And even if the Tribes' authority took priority
over Maine law, that would only keep the State from being able to issue
permits to discharge sources within tribal waters. 49 However, this was simply
not the case, the court explained, because section 6204 gave the State of Maine
"overriding authority" to regulate discharge within the scope of the Clean
Water Act. 5 0
The court did, however, give a little more consideration to the Tribes'
argument that the phrase "internal tribal matters" might include regulating the
discharge of pollutants within tribal waters. After noting that the phrase
"internal tribal matters" is "assuredly vague,''. the court relied upon the fact
that in the statute, there are four examples of internal affairs listed, including
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.at 45.
Id.at42 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1725(d)).
Id.at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 44.
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tribal membership, residence in tribal territory, elections, and use of settlement
funds.'52 Though the list is not exclusive,' it is indicative of what the statute
intended to mean by the phrase. 5' Additionally, the court noted that generally,
Maine law governs the natural resources of the Tribes and their territories, and
the "internal tribal matters" exception "does not displace general Maine law
on most substantive subjects."' 5 Thus, the court concluded that the statute
reserved the rights specifically listed in the statute, as well as "other matters
of the same kind"' 56 but did not take priority over other Maine laws, including
environmental regulations.'
Next, the court discussed the only two decisions construing the phrase
"internal tribal matters" 58: Akins and Fellencer. The court distinguished both
cases by noting that in each, the State did not claim any right to regulate the
activity over which the Tribe was asserting authority,5 9 whereas in the case at
hand, Maine affirmatively asserted authority to regulate discharges over both
non-tribal and tribal facilities.' 0 The First Circuit's decision and analysis
presents concerns that will be discussed below.
V.Analysis
The court's analysis is somewhat convincing as to the nineteen non-tribal
facilities. However, regarding the two facilities operated by Indians and
discharging into tribal waters, the court's determination that the issuance of
discharge permits does not qualify as an "internal tribal matter" disregards its
own precedent and undermines the importance of protection of Indian tribes.
The First Circuit brushed off the Akins/Fellencerbalancing test by claiming
that "discharging pollutants into navigable waters is not a borderline case in

152. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206 (1996).
153. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 1997).
154. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 44 (citing Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478,489 (Me.
1983)). This canon of statutory construction is known as noscitur a sociis (Latin for "it is
known by its associates") and holds "that the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word should
be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the context." MERRIAMWEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 331

(1996).

155. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 44.
156. Id. at 44-45 (citing United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2000))
(emphasis removed).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.(citing Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 1997); Penobscot
Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 710-11 (1st Cir. 1999)).
160. Id. at45.
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which balancing or ambiguity canons can alter the result."'' By failing to
even consider the balancing of these factors, the court ignored several
important facts. First, the court had previously noted that the phrase "include
or including" is a term of enlargement 6 2 Second, nothing in the statute
indicated that the list of examples provided after "internal tribal matters" was
exclusive. Third, the court's own decision in Akins involved issuance of
permits for tree stumpage, a natural resource on Indian lands, and the court had
no problem determining that was an internal tribal matter. 6 3 Thus, the court
should have at least considered some of the factors in the Akins/Fellencer
balancing test.
Had the court performed this instructive analysis, it would have reached the
conclusion that the regulation of discharges by Indian-owned facilities into
Indian waters is wholly an "internal tribal matter." First, considering the
impact on non-Indians, the court should have taken a clue from the EPA and
considered the fact that the impact on non-Indians was not substantial.,64 The
Akins court seemed to emphasize this factor, by immediately indicating that
stumpage permits appeared to be an "internal tribal matter" after determining
65
that the interests of non-members were not at issue. 1
Next, if the court considered the same factors it did in Akins, it would have
to consider that "the control of the permitting process operates as a control
over the growth, health, and reaping"'" of certain natural resources, such as
timber in Akins, or fish in Johnson. In Akins, this was an argument in favor of
' 67
the stumpage permits being classified as an "internal tribal matter.'
Additionally, allowing the EPA to retain control over the issuance of
pollution permits does not impair or deteriorate any interests of the state. If
anything, this would increase the water quality, as the EPA would work hand
in hand with the tribes to set standards high enough to sustain their fishing
activities. In no way would this harm any interest the state may have in the
quality of its waters. In fact, it would likely increase water quality.
Finally, it would seem consistent with prior legal understandings to view the
issuance of permits as an "internal tribal matter." Two prior First Circuit
decisions analyzed the phrase "internal tribal matters," but were immediately
161. Id. at 46.
162. Akins, 130 F.3d at 486.
163. Id. at 490.
164. Approval of Application by Maine to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,052-01, 65,066 (Nov. 18, 2003).
165. Akins, 130 F.3d at 486.
166. Id.at 487.
167. Id.
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distinguished by the Johnson court. The court's distinction was based on the
premise that in both Akins and Fellencer,the state did not claim the right to
regulate the activity at issue. 6 This reasoning is critically flawed for one
main reason. While the Akins/Fellencer test does recommend an analysis of
the interests of both the tribe and the state, the analysis of the state's interests
is not conditioned on the state's assertion of authority. In fact, in Akins and
Fellencer,the interests of both parties were analyzed and considered' 69 even
though the state had not "disclaimed any interest in regulation."' ° Thus,
instead of attempting to distinguish the only two cases interpreting and
providing guidance on the meaning of the phrase "internal tribal matters" the
court should have followed its own precedent and given a thorough analysis
of each factor. Such a task would necessarily have opened the court's eyes to
a different conclusion.
The court agreed with Maine that the phrase "internal tribal matters,"
though not exclusive, would only extend to the examples listed in the statute
and "matters of the same kind."'' The court's explanation that that phrase
"does not displace general Maine law on most substantive subjects, including
environmental regulation' 172 ignores the holding of Akins. Akins involved a
permitting system similar to the one at issue in Johnson, but was for stumpage
7
permits relating to the harvesting of timber from the Penobscot Reservation.'
The Akins court applied the same factors and interpreted the same statute at
issue in Johnson, but determined, despite the specific grant of authority to
Maine over all land and natural resources of the tribe, 174 that the permitting
75
system was indeed an "internal tribal matter" and did so as a matter of law.
Thus, upon an analysis of the prior case law and precedent, it is evident that
the First Circuit's decision is unprincipled at best, having failed to consider the
most important and critical factors in such a powerful decision.
Further, with the stakes being so high, the court should have considered the
interests of the tribe in allowing the EPA to regulate the issuance of pollution
permits into their waters instead of the State of Maine. The toxins being
released into the rivers upon which these tribes depend are extremely
168.
169.
1999).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2007).
Akins, 130 F.3d at 487; Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 710-11 (1st Cir.
Johnson, 498 F.3d at 45.
Id.
Id.
Akins, 130 F.3d at 483.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (1996).
Akins, 130 F.3d at 488.
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dangerous and accumulate in the very fish and other organisms the tribes hunt
for sustenance.7 6 Public policy alone demands a much more in-depth and
serious analysis of the interests of the tribes and the possible repercussions of
ceding control over water regulations to the state.
Conclusion
This court's decision will affect the health and well-being of two of Maine's
federally recognized Indian tribes. Although there are multiple statute sections
that appearto grant to Maine the authority over these regulations, the "fine
print" must be taken into account and the statutes must be construed in a way
that will ensure the tribes' health and continued ability to fish for sustenance.
The First Circuit's decision took that away, setting a dangerous precedent in
terms of not only divesting the tribes' already limited sovereignty, but also in
terms of failing to protect the tribes' health and the continued existence of their
tribal culture. It is not apparent that certiorarihas been sought to the United
States Supreme Court, but in the event that it is, the court should reverse the
First Circuit's ruling and reinstate the EPA's order, giving further
consideration to the nineteen non-tribal facilities as well.

176. Final Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 7.
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